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1. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
The concept of risk stems from the inability to see into the future. As Shaw (2003) 
describes, cause and effect can be separated over time as well as over geographical 
location. Coupled with what he describes as a cyclic cause-effect-feedback-learning 
system a complex environment is created. In fact, it is so complex that it seems 
impossible to determine all decisions taken by oneself and other people up to the 
present, their outcome, how they correlate and how these effects influence an intended 
outcome. But even if it was possible, there would still be an element of uncertainty 
because of our inability to accurately predict uncontrolled events, such as 
thunderstorms, earthquakes, etc. Bernstein (2001) put it simpler but added an element 
of management when he came to the conclusion that:  
 risk in our world is nothing more than uncertainty about the decisions that other human beings 
 are going to make and how we can best respond to those decisions.  
It is important to remember at this point that risk can be defined as unintended 
outcome (Shaw 2003). This can be positive or negative; often described as upside risk or 
downside risk respectively. Bernstein’s (2001) definition of risk seems useful since it 
contains the notion that it is possible to influence outcomes as a response to unforeseen 
effects. Meulbroek (2001) argues that businesses always had some form of systems to 
deal with this. But the systems were fragmented and scattered across enterprises. 
However, as these enterprises are linked in both a legal and economical context, it is 
important to link these systems and make them centrally manageable and transparent. It 
is important to control and manage risk, since it is impossible to opt out. The outcomes 
of a business will be influenced by other factors whether they were taken into account 
or not. Power (2004) argued that risk control and management is also important since it 
enables corporations to optimise their insurance premiums and cover. Especially 
important when risks are self-insured. 
 
The Cadbury Code (Cadbury, 1992) and especially the Turnbull Guidance (Turnbull 
1999) focused on risk management. This brought the concept of ‘risk’ to the very centre 
of corporate governance and linked the idea to internal control (Spira and Page 2002). 
Today, Corporate Governance is high on the agenda of many national and international 
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bodies. The European Commission (EC) is addressing Corporate Governance in 
conjunction with the company law reform in their Action Plan (EC 2003a). In fact, the 
former EU Market Commissioner Bolkestein is reported to have said that company law 
and corporate governance is right at the centre of the political agenda (European 
Corporate Governance Institute, 2003). That corporate governance is an important 
subject in the UK can be seen from the response to consultation preceding the EU’s 
Action Plan. Approximately a quarter of the comments came from the UK (EC 2003b). 
Also, Lance (2001) argued that the UK would be the country with the most corporate 
control activities. In the view of Solomon and Solomon (2004) the UK was the world 
leader in corporate governance. Ever since the Cadbury Code companies in the UK 
were encouraged to comply with the spirit rather than the letter (Cadbury 1992, p. 12 par 
1.10), as opposed to the rule-based Sarbanes-Oxley Act (USA, 2002) in the United 
States. Carey and Turnbull (2001) emphasised the importance of this open textured 
regulation. This is, however, not unchallenged.  Paragraphs 5.18 to 5.24 of the 
Government’s paper on Modernising Company Law (DTI 2004) deal with civil and 
criminal sanctions for violations of the Combined Code (FRC 2003). Dewing and 
Russell (2004) acknowledged that a command-and-control regulation could lead to the 
proliferation of unnecessary, complex rules but argue in favour of a centralised body of 
stature to provide interpretation and enforcement of a corporate governance code. 
Today, Sec. 17.19(a) and 23.46 of the Listing Rules (UKLA, 2004) compel all listed 
companies in the UK to comply with the Combined Code. However, the only sanction 
available is delisting from the London Stock Exchange (LSE), which is likely to be out 
of proportion for the majority of violations. Also, Section 7 of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 contains a duty to observe good corporate governance practices. 
It fails, however, to give a clear indication of possible sanctions for non-compliance. 
Consequently the sampled companies disclosed only 67.2% of all mandatory 
disclosures. 
 
The self-regulating, comply or explain approach lead to varying degrees of information 
provided by companies about their risk management systems. Solomon et al. (2000) 
found that there is a strong need for increased corporate risk disclosure that would help 
to improve portfolio investment decisions. Studies predating the current Turnbull 
Guidance, such as Garsombke (1979), showed that risk and disclosures are not casually 
related in the United States (US). Nair and Frank (1980), as well as Benjamin and Stanga 
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(1977) showed that different users of annual reports require disclosure of different 
information. Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) showed that there is low consensus between 
producers and users of disclosed information. Of course, the research of the early 1980s 
would have to be repeated to see whether the conclusions still hold true today. 
Developments in stakeholder, political cost, legitimacy and, of course, agency theory 
might have changed disclosure behaviour and perception of importance of disclosure in 
recent years. However, Proctor and Miles (2003, p. 191) said that current disclosure regime 
leaves much to be desired. 
 
An important counterpoint to risk-related reporting should be considered. Following 
portfolio theory, conceived by Markowitz (1952), it is possible for the shareholders to 
diversify unsystematic risk away. So, why should a business invest in risk control and 
management systems when it will not create additional cash flow or shareholder value? 
And why should shareholders be interested in it? First of all it should be remembered 
that not all investors are able to diversify. There could be, for instance, the outright 
buyer of a business who has not the ability to invest sufficiently in other businesses to 
diversify his or her unsystematic risk. Another point was described by Stulz (2001). He 
argued that having no risk management system in place could lead to higher volatility in 
cash-flows; it could result in unexpectedly low cash flows that cause indirect costs for 
the shareholders, since share prices are based on the market’s expectation of future cash 
flows. Risk management does, however, come with an inherent problem.  Power (2004) 
argued that risk management systems could start to manage their own risk. In this line 
of thought risk management could come to a point where directors are not mostly 
concerned with making business judgements but ‘defendable’ decisions. In this way 
nurturing a defensive culture and ultimately stifling entrepreneurial action. Power (2004) 
believes that this holds true especially in an environment with many potentially very 
costly and reputation damaging corporate liability litigation cases. 
 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2004) announced that they have set-up a group 
to review the Turnbull Guidance. The Group is looking into various areas of the code. 
Hodge, C., observing member of the FRC Group, said that one particular part of this 
review is the disclosure requirements (personal communication, September 7, 2004). 
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1.2 Objective of Research 
The paper endeavours to find the determinants of narrative statements in annual reports 
from companies in one business sector about risk management systems and internal 
control. The knowledge about quantity, and more importantly determinants is valuable 
to policy makers. Regulators in the UK have so far avoided a box-ticking-exercise 
(Solomon and Solomon 2004) in terms of corporate governance. The US took a more 
prescriptive approach with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (USA, 2002). Policy makers in the 
UK are currently reviewing risk-reporting regulation. Although limited by design, 
knowledge from this research could deliver hints for their future regulation and provide 
an impetus for more empirical research.  
 
 
1.3 Summary of Methodology 
UK companies listed under business support and services sector were chosen as the 
sample population. From 71 companies, 50 sample units were drawn by random 
sampling without replacement. The latest available annual reports from the 50 sampling 
units were collected. The annual reports from two sampling units did not contain the 
required information and were consequently eliminated from the sample. Preliminary 
calculations uncovered two outliers which were also eliminated.  
 
The determinants should be established by linear multiple regression. Ten predictor 
variables were selected based on literature and set in a theoretical framework. The 
predictors contained two different measurements as proxy for company size. In order to 
avoid collinearity between the two predictors, two separate models were calculated with 
one size predictor each.  
 
The constant in the regression models was a self-constructed disclosure index. The 
Turnbull Guidance and FRS 13 were distilled to 71 items which could be reported by 
any one sampling unit, providing content validity to this paper. The scoring was 
recorded dichotomously resulting in an unweighted index measuring information 
quantity. 
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1.4 Summary of Results 
Model 1 containing capital employed as proxy for size, and the remaining eight 
predictors explained 44.8% of variation in the dependent with variations in the 
predictors. The effect size was F=3.25 at 0.01 significance level. Model 2 containing 
turnover as size predictor and the same remaining eight predictors as in Model 1 was 
able to explain 44.3% of variation of the dependent. Effect size was F=3.19 at 0.01 
significance level. 
 
The significant determinants of Model 1 was capital employed and average substantial 
shareholding. In Model 2, turnover was the significant determinant. Average substantial 
shareholding was just above the 0.05 significant threshold. Insignificant in both models 
were, audit committee size, freefloat, gearing, ratio of independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee, ROCE, internal audit, and ratio of non-executive 
directors on the board. 
 
 
1.5 Overview of the Project 
This paper is divided into four chapters. This opening chapter provides a summary of 
the project and an overview of the following chapters. The second chapter establishes 
the theoretical framework of disclosure behaviour in quite some detail. Since there is no 
single theory to explain disclosure behaviour, the interacting theories of the framework 
are central to understanding the results. Chapter two then goes on to provide an 
overview of previous research in the field. The theoretical framework together with 
previous research provide the basis of the hypotheses development. Chapter three deals 
with research methodology. The closing chapter four contains the findings, the 
conclusions drawn from it, the limitations and further research.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter sheds some light on the theoretical framework on corporate disclosure 
behaviour. It does then proceed to introduce the predictor variables in the context of 
the theoretical framework and develop the research hypotheses based on previous 
research. 
 
Considerable research has been undertaken into social disclosure. Many researchers 
have striven to explain why businesses choose to disclose information. A number of 
theories have been developed and used in an attempt to explain business managers’ 
disclosure behaviour. However, no single theory can fully explain the reasons why 
companies choose to disclose or withhold information. It is, rather, a framework of 
theories within which context this study should be understood.  
 
 
2.1 Agency Theory and Asymmetric Information 
Adam Smith (1776, book I, chapter VII), in his discussion about wages, recognised that 
there may be conflicting interests between masters and workers. In modern agency 
theory they would be described as principals and managers, their agents. The key aspect 
of agency theory in the context of this study is the information gap between managers 
and principals. Managers may get information in the course of their close day-to-day 
involvement with the business which is not available to the principals. This information 
can be of two different types. It could be about actions unobserved by the principals, i.e. 
hidden action, or about information unavailable to, or ignored by the principals, i.e. 
hidden knowledge. This information in literature is sometimes termed private 
knowledge or adverse selection. The terms can be confusing, as adverse selection is 
rather a possible outcome from this asymmetric information.  
 
Many scholars, Eng et al. (2001), for instance, realised that information is an important 
factor in the agency relationship and its cost. It is argued that this information 
asymmetry can entail cost. For instance, Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Watts (1977) 
argue that disclosure reduces agency cost. The managers may make choices and 
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decisions which are influenced by moral hazards, i.e. make use of private information 
unobservant of the principal’s interest. Hodgson (2004) emphasised that the cost only 
arises if the agent’s choices and decisions are influenced by interest discrepant from the 
interest of the principal. Either the principal will have to pay some information rent to 
the agent in order to reach an efficient use of economic resources, or the principals risk 
choices and decision affected by adverse selection or moral hazard. (Jones and Butler 
1992). Copeland and Galai (1983), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), Welker (1995), 
Coller and Yohn (1997) and Healy et al (1999), to name a few, all supported the main 
argument that revealing information lowers information asymmetry and thus reduces 
cost of capital. There are two main rationales developed by scholars to explain how 
information asymmetry can affect cost. 
 
Kyle (1985) argued that asymmetric information amongst stock market participants 
could impose adverse selection costs on liquidity traders and market makers. Market 
makers can recoup their cost by widening bid/ask spreads. Scholars have hence tried 
decomposing this spread into several cost parameters. Glosten and Harris (1988) 
decomposed the spread into three contributors: order processing, inventory holding, 
and adverse selection. Madhavan et al. (1997) decomposed the spread into four 
parameters: asymmetric information, cost of supplying liquidity, the probability that a 
transaction takes place inside the spread, and the autocorrelation of order flow. Both 
models ultimately fail in providing a perfect tool to predict the cost of asymmetric 
information. However, the models indicate that lowering information asymmetry and 
thus adverse selection does lower the bid/ask spread and hence the cost of equity.  
 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), in their study of market microstructure, showed that 
adverse selection reduces market liquidity and increases price volatility. In support, Lang 
and Lundholm (1996) found that more analysts follow firms with superior disclosure 
policies. The enhanced transparency added by analysts was found to be a significant 
contributor to the inverse relation of analysts with the adverse selection parameter 
(Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1995). Butterworth (2001) argued that more transparency 
allows the market to evaluate a company more accurately. This does not necessarily 
mean at a higher equilibrium price (Madhaven 2000). The main argument here seems 
intuitive: more information lowers adverse selection, volatility, and increases market 
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liquidity by allowing the market to channel all information into the price and avoid 
surprises. Some studies are indicative to that argument. Firth (1980) found that more 
information is disclosed voluntarily by small companies (but not large companies) 
before raising finance. Lang and Lundholm (2000) found evidence that companies 
increased their information disclosure activities over a sustained period of time (six to 
nine months) before seasoned equity offerings 
 
There are counter-arguments to be considered. Cost of equity capital is a theoretical 
construct and therefore difficult to measure. Many scholars have used liquidity or bid-
ask spread as proxies for cost of capital measurement, e.g. Healy et al. (1999) or Coller 
and Yohn (1997). Some others like Botosan (1997), or Botosan and Plumlee (2002) 
sought a direct link. Their calculations are based on assumption and forecasts and 
therefore cannot provide complete certainty.  
 
Also, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) delivered a rationale that disclosure does not always 
lead to minimisation of information asymmetry. If an announcement is interpreted 
differently by different market participants, there is a possibility that information 
asymmetry is increased by a disclosure. 
 
 
2.2 Positive Accounting Theory and Political Cost 
Positive accounting theory provides another starting point for thought. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978), by examining lobbying behaviour of oil companies in the US 
during the 1970s, developed the positive accounting theory. At the heart of this theory, 
they argued that managers make accounting choices in their own self-interest. They 
argued that:  
 …corporations employ a number of devices, such as social responsibility campaigns in the 
 media government lobbying and selection of accounting procedures to minimize reported 
 earnings.  
High earnings, so their argument, may cause an adverse reaction from the public since it 
could be associated with monopoly rent and the company could also be exposed to 
adverse political action. These adverse political actions could cause costs, e.g. legal cost 
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for a company opposing political actions, labour unions demanding increased salaries 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Sethi (1977) said earlier that companies are permanently 
…under attack from every quarter. There are several theories revolving around these two 
thoughts, which will be discussed below. Panchapakesan and McKinnon (1992) and 
Lemon and Cahan (1997) sought to explain disclosure behaviour with positive 
accounting theory. It is worth noting that positive accounting theory as perceived 
originally by Watts and Zimmerman (1990) refers only to accounting figures reported 
and influenced accounting choices. Campaigns in the media… (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978) are only undertaken to lower profits recognised in the profit and loss account. 
Therefore, broadening positive accounting theory to disclosures in the annual report, as 
Panchapakesan and McKinnon (1992) and Lemon and Cahan (1997) tried, is not 
without problems. Disclosures in annual reports are not as costly as an advertisement 
campaign and therefore do not substantially lower profits in the accounts. Additionally, 
disclosures in annual reports are not as visible as a media campaign and, therefore, 
create a problem with the second argument concerning political cost advanced by Watts 
and Zimmerman (1990). In positive accounting theory, accounting choices are made in 
the self-interest to avoid political cost. Watts and Zimmerman (1990, p. 133) 
corroborated in their review that positive accounting theory with regards to 
 political cost as a function of reported profits. Thus, an incentive to manage reporting 
 accounting numbers.  
It seems intuitive that companies not only manage accounting figures but other 
disclosures as well in an endeavour to avoid political cost. They might, for instance, 
choose to signal to the market that they employ superior risk management systems to 
avoid stricter regulation by extending their relative disclosures.  
 
 
2.3 Signalling Theory 
Signalling theory should also be considered in the context of disclosure. Spence (1973, 
1974) developed a theory, by examining the job market, where the sending of signals 
was used to convince others of the presence of a certain quality. Spence (1976) and Ross 
(1979) found that companies with positive information (superior performance) wish to 
identify themselves by broadcasting information to the market. Generally well 
performing companies might signal their success to the market by increasing their 
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disclosures. Grossmann (1981), Milgrom (1981), Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1986) all 
supported this line of thought. Trueman (1986) argued that firms would signal superior 
management. Djankov et al. (2001) argued that when firms communicate to the market 
they contribute to the accumulation of reputation which could in turn significantly help 
to maximise future performance.  
 
 
2.4 Stakeholder Theory 
To whom may the signals be sent? Dodd (1932) argued that a business is only private 
property in a qualified sense, and that society would demand that business is carried on 
in such a way as to safeguard the interests of those who deal with the company, even if 
that means that the rights of the owners are curtailed. A trade-off between conflicting 
interests of shareholders and stakeholders is implied. Consequently, Boulton et al (2000) 
argued that directors should neither act in the best interest of the shareholders nor 
stakeholders, but in the company’s best interest. They argued that the integration of 
stakeholders interests can provide real benefits for shareholders. Crane and Matten 
(2004) referred to this as an enlightened self-interest. But even if it were accepted that 
shareholders are interested not only in short-term wealth maximisation but in longer-
term goals, the theory still raises questions. Neither shareholders nor stakeholders have 
unitarian interests. Various stakeholder groups, for instance, might have conflicting 
interests. Meeting some of the interests of the stakeholders might have no effect on the 
company at all, thus negating the enlightened self-interest argument. Sterling (1990) and 
Chambers (1993) also called for a more cautious approach. They claimed that utility 
maximisation could always be the underlying rationale in all disclosure behaviour, even 
when other factors triggered one particular disclosure. Nevertheless, communication 
with stakeholders is important. Gray et al. (1996) was able to show that agents used 
information to manipulate stakeholders in order to gain their support. Therefore, 
despite above described dilemma, it is worth exploring the relationship between 
companies and the outside world in more detail.  
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2.5 Legitimacy Theory 
Boulton et al. (2000) argued that a company’s success would depend on its a bility to 
connect its own assets with the assets of others (i.e. stakeholders) and exploit the 
dynamics between these assets to create and realise value. Moon and Bonny (2001) 
argued that it would be crucial to form successful relationships with diverse 
stakeholders. It is that thought of explicit or implicit contract that can be found again in 
legitimacy theory. Suchman (1995, p. 574) defined: 
 Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
 proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
 definitions. 
A strong link to ethics and Wieland’s (2003) concept of Corporate Citizenship becomes 
apparent1. Guthrie and Parker (1989) argued that legitimacy theory is closely related to 
social contract theory. This theory hypothesized that morality is based on uniform social 
accords that best serve the interests of those who make the agreements. Shocker and 
Sethi (1974) argued that such a contract with explicit and implicit terms is conceived to 
exist between an organisation and the public at large.  
 
Legitimacy theory has various dimensions. Suchman (1995, p. 576) explained that 
organisational structures, such as capitalism for instance, endeavour to gain acceptance, 
i.e. legitimacy and institutionalisation from society by making it seem natural and 
meaningful. On an organisational level, legitimacy theory underpins above macro-
theoretical dimension and is sometimes referred to as strategic legitimacy theory. 
Underlying this level …is a process, legitimation, by which an organization seeks approval [or 
avoidance of sanction] from groups in society (Kaplan and Ruland, 1991, p. 370). This 
process level is divided into four phases. In the first phase legitimacy is to be 
established. Hearit (1995, p.2) said that a company needed to take into account the 
socially constructed expectations in its early stages. Elkington (1997) explained that 
these expectations constitute a superordinate system that encompasses economic, 
environmental and social factor relationships. The second phase is maintaining 
legitimacy. Ashford and Gibbs (1990, p. 183) argued that activities of this phase would 
involve ongoing role performance and …symbolic assurances that all is well…and attempts 
to foresee and prevent challenges to legitimacy. The next phase is extending legitimacy. 
                                                 
1 Although the important link to business ethics is apparent, it remains largely unconsidered in this 
paper. Risk disclosures, the focus of this s tudy, is not strongly linked to business ethics. 
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Ashford and Gibbs (1990. p. 180) described that in this phase management undertakes 
intense and proactive attempts to win confidence and support from a variety of 
potential constituents. The last phase is defending legitimacy. Legitimacy is a dynamic 
construct. Community expectations may change and organisations may lose legitimacy 
even if they have not changed their activities (Deegan et al. 2002, p. 319-320).  
 
The above described phases do not necessarily follow a prescribed order. Hybels (1995, 
p. 243) postulated that it is important to examine the relevant stakeholders and how 
each influences the flow of important resources either by direct control or by the 
communication of good will. From this it seems important that the fitting information is 
given to any one stakeholder group. Matthews (1993, p. 350) concluded that if an actual 
or potential disparity exists between a value system of an organisation and society there 
would be a threat to its legitimacy; the social contract could be withdrawn. Conversely, 
successful communication that the company does act in compliance with the terms of 
the social contract and is contributing more benefits to the society than cost, it will be 
posited to perform better. Carruther (1995, p. 324) said that organisations are not only 
granted legitimacy, but sometimes they go out and get it. This would explain the advertisement of 
BP plc. in The Economist (2004) in which they report exclusively on their contribution 
to the performing and visual arts. Matthews (1993, p. 36) dichotomised between 
managers who disclose information on moral grounds, i.e. presenting the company to 
act within the terms of the contract, and on pragmatic grounds, i.e. organisational 
legitimacy is the motivating factor.  
 
Disclosures can be made in various forms. Patten (2002, p.153) and others recognised 
the importance of the media as a catalyst to increased pressures from stakeholders, not 
dissimilar to the concept of vulnerability in political cost theory. This study, however, 
concentrates exclusively on disclosures made in the annual report. Deegan et al. (2002) 
examined disclosure behaviour of an Australian mining and petroleum company and 
showed that the company had disclosure reactions to concerns of the community. 
Patten (1992) researched change of disclosure behaviour after the Exxon-Valdez 
disaster. He found that all North American petroleum companies responded to the 
disaster except Exxon itself; fitting somewhat into the a bove described findings of 
O’Donovan (2002). This study also showed that in this incident companies did take a 
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proactive approach to counteract the risk of lowered legitimacy even though the 
companies themselves were not involved in the disaster.  
On a side note it should be mentioned that researchers, such as Diamond (1985) and 
King et al. (1990) argued that companies would disclose information to reduce 
transaction cost. In their line of thought, companies disclose performance forecasts in 
order to reduce the incentive to acquire private knowledge or, as in Skinner (1994), 
avoid litigation. However, this theory is time sensitive and is therefore regarded less 
important for disclosures in annual reports.  
 
 
2.6 Hypotheses Development 
Positive accounting theory and, more importantly, political cost theory suggest that 
disclosures from companies are attempts to reduce political cost. Stakeholder theory 
considers the expectations’ impact of the different stakeholder groups on disclosure 
behaviour. Legitimacy theory, in contrast, does not make the assumption of rational, 
wealth-maximising individuals acting within an efficient market. Both stakeholder theory 
and legitimacy theory consider organisations as part of a wider social system. Only 
stakeholder theory, however, recognises that some individual parts of this social system 
are more powerful than others. Legitimacy theory, on the other hand, treats the social 
system as a whole. The assumptions of above discussed theories are not dissimilar, 
rather they offer alternative insights into motivations of disclosure behaviour. It is not 
possible to isolate one theory to explain disclosure behaviour fully. But theories are also 
not competing. They offer alternative ways to comprehend the concepts behind 
corporate disclosure. The theories in fact build a framework within which paradigmatic 
pluralism enhances the understanding of the multitude of issues within the underlying 
rationales. 
 
 
2.7 Previous Research 
A substantial body of research into determinants of corporate disclosure has been 
developed. Please see Table 1 for a summary of frequently cited literature in this field. 
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The very early empirical research was conducted by Cerf (1961) and Singhvi and Desai 
(1971). Already at this early stage, earnings margin and size amongst others were found 
important as factors influencing disclosure. During the 1970s, most research on 
information disclosure concentrated on the US. Beaver (1978, p. 44) observed that the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued more accounting releases since 1972 
than it had in the previous 26 years. 
Since then disclosure policy has become more comprehensive and diversified and so 
have the determinants used in research. In this paper these determinants or independent 
variables, will be called predictors following the explanations by Field (2000). Land and 
Lundholm (1993) and Wallace et al. (1994) grouped predictors into three segments: 
structure, performance, and market related which are not mutually exclusive.  
Land and Lundholm (1993) defined structure related as characteristics that are likely to 
remain stable for a longer period of time. In this study, audit committee size, average 
substantial shareholding, capital employed, freefloat, gearing, independent non-executive 
directors on audit committee ratio, internal audit, non-executive director ratio, and 
turnover represent structure related predictors. Profitability (ROCE)is related to 
performance. Market related predictors are not included, as this research is solely based 
on information derived from annual reports.  
 
 
2.8 Predictors: Capital Employed and Turnover 
Size was probably the most commonly used predictor in previous studies. Ball and 
Foster (1982) argued that size could be used as surrogate in almost all information 
theories. They are more likely to have larger groups of stakeholders and consequently 
attract more media attention which could increase vulnerability to political cost and 
threaten legitimacy. Especially the impact of the media should not be disregarded in 
academic studies (Zingales 2000). Size is helping larger corporations to produce 
information that they are willing to disclose. More formal internal information is 
produced in order to keep all parts of the business informed in the normal course of 
business. This information can easily be transformed and publicised. The marginal cost 
of disclosing and presenting information is lower than for smaller firms. Additionally, 
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Dye (1985) and Meek et al. (1995) found that the larger corporation has fewer 
competitive disadvantages by disclosing information. A number of different surrogates 
to measure size have been used throughout literature. Turnover, number of employees, 
total assets, market capitalisation to name but a few.  
Legitimacy theory receives a special role for rationales behind size predictors. Especially 
Lemon and Cahan (1997) acknowledged this. Clarke and Gibson-Sweet (1999) showed 
empirically that larger companies and firms in sectors with high public presence were 
more inclined to use their annual reports to disclose their benefits to the community 
and environment. Dissenting from Toms (2000) and somewhat contradicting to the 
main argument of legitimacy theory, O’Donovan (2002) found, based on experimental 
evidence, that the lower the organisation’s perceived legitimacy, the less likely it is that 
they bother to provide social and environmental disclosure. Whether this can be 
broadened remains to be seen. 
 
There are several surrogates to measure the size of a company. Total assets were used in 
many previous studies, such as Cooke (1989b) and Inchausti (1997). Capital employed 
was used in this study as measures of size. This measure does have the advantage over 
total assets that positions that do not add size, such as provisions for liabilities and 
charges are not included. It is, however, acknowledged that the effect can be expected 
to be minimal on the outcome. This slight advantage is set against an also slight 
disadvantage. Capital employed is not universally defined and, hence, computed 
differently. Again, the effect of this can be expected to be minimal on the outcome. 
Capital employed is computed as suggested by the Association of Chartered Certified 
Accounts (ACCA), total assets minus current liabilities.  
H1: Capital employed is positively related to risk disclosure. 
 
Due to the absence of a commonly defined size measurement, companies vary in size 
depending on the measurement employed. To partly offset this effect, turnover is 
introduced as a second size predictor. This second size predictor is likely to correlate to 
a certain extent with capital employed. The research hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: Turnover is positively related to risk disclosure. 
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2.9 Predictor: Gearing 
The picture becomes less clear for gearing. Malone et al. (1993) argued that highly 
geared companies may disclose more information to satisfy their lenders’ needs. As 
stated earlier, Jensen and Meckling (1976) were amongst the first to argue that 
information disclosure is correlated to agency cost. This correlation could become more 
significant since lenders transfer wealth to managers and shareholders. 
 
The argument that the reduction or removal of information asymmetry reduces capital 
cost was extended to the cost of loan capital. Clarkson et al (1996) found that more 
information from the borrower reduces uncertainty in the risk estimates of the lender 
and ultimately lowers the cost of debts. Hossain et al. (1995), Brennan and Hourigan 
(2000), as well as Etteredge et al. (2002) confirmed a positive correlation between 
gearing and information disclosure with their studies.  
 
But risk and the users’ needs do not necessarily positively correlate.  Buzby (1974) found 
that correlation between relative importance of the items and the extent of their 
disclosure is low. McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Meek et al. (1995), Raffournier 
(1995), Inchausti (1997), and Patton and Zelenka (1997) found no significant correlation 
between gearing and information disclosure in the countries they researched2. The 
research hypothesis is as follows: 
H3: Gearing is positively related to risk disclosure 
 
 
2.10 Predictor: NED-Ratio 
Agency theory is the main driver for the selection of the predictors: Non-Executive-
Director ratio (NED-Ratio), average substantial shareholding, free float, size of audit 
committee, independent Non-Executive-Director ratio (iNED-Ratio), and internal 
audit.  
The costs associated with the partition of ownership and management, as described 
above, is well developed and acknowledged. The Higgs Report (Higgs 2003) and its 
integration into the new Combined Code is an example of one of the more recent 
                                                 
2 Meek et al. (1995) for the UK amongst other countries 
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regulatory developments in the UK in an attempt to reduce agency cost. The emphasis 
was put on Non-Executive Directors and the new notion of their independence was 
introduced. There are only a few studies that linked corporate governance structures to 
disclosure. Ho and Wong (2001) examined companies listed in Hong Kong and related 
their disclosures to independent directors, audit committee and other variables. Their 
study confirmed a positive correlation between audit committee and a negative 
correlation between family members on the board and disclosure. Although they did not 
establish a direct causal relation between non-executive directors and disclosure, they 
did prove that members of the board can influence disclosure. The research hypothesis 
is as follows: 
H4: Non-Executive Director Ratio is positively related to risk disclosure 
 
 
2.11 Predictors: Audit Committee Size and iNED Ratio 
The new Combined Code recommends that the audit committee should consist of at 
least three independent non-executive directors. Neither the chairman nor the chief 
executive officer should sit on the audit committee. The audit committee functions as 
control organ of the company. The strong link to agency theory, i.e. principal controls 
agents, is obvious. Although there is no previous research into the correlation of audit 
committee and its structure to disclosure, the new emphasis placed on the independence 
of non-executive directors coupled with agency theory provide sufficient support to 
include the following two predictors: Audit Committee size and iNED ratio. iNED ratio 
is the percentage of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee. The 
research hypotheses are as follows: 
H5: Audit Committee size is positively related to risk disclosure 
H6: iNED ratio is positively related to risk disclosure 
 
 
2.12 Predictor: Average Substantial Shareholding 
As early as Cerf (1961), ownership has been a subject of study in connection with 
disclosure; it is a fairly intuitive choice. The concept of partition of ownership and 
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management lies at the very heart of agency theory. However, Raffournier (1995) could 
not find a correlation of significance. Two different predictors are used for this study to 
mirror two different aspects of ownership.  
 
The impact of ownership structure was researched by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who 
concluded that large shareholdings do have an impact on management3. McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993) confirmed a positive relationship between powerful shareholders 
and disclosure. The first ownership predictor in this study is a proxy measure of 
influential shareholders. It follows the line of thought of Ho and Wong (2001) who 
studied the impact of dominant personalities on disclosure. Influential shareholders 
could gain private knowledge and hence create adverse selection or moral hazard cost. 
Therefore, institutional shareholding has been used as surrogate for information 
asymmetry literature. It could be argued that a company could counteract this cost by 
making information required by a few available to all.  
 
It could also be argued that power derived from concentrated ownership can be used 
more efficiently to control the agent and to extract more information. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) argued that larger shareholders exercise a better monitoring of 
management than numerous small shareholders. Stricter monitoring does not 
necessarily mean more disclosures, as influential shareholders may have other ways of 
receiving information than the annual report.   
 
Information about ‘Dominant personality’ as developed by Ho and Wong (2001) is 
usually unavailable from the annual report and is anyway difficult to measure. Instead, 
the total shareholdings of all substantial shareholders as disclosed in the annual report 
was divided by the total number of substantial shareholders. A mean substantial 
shareholding percentage was arrived at. Higher percentages suggest higher concentrated 
shareholdings commanding a higher degree of influence. Smaller percentages suggest 
the opposite. There is, of course, a caveat in this approximation. It does not allow for 
investment management funds and other institutional investors. The research 
hypothesis is as follows: 
                                                 
3 They did, however, not explicitly establish a relationship from institutional shareholding to 
disclosure. 
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H7: Average Substantial Shareholding is positively related to risk disclosure. 
 
2.13 Predictor: Freefloat 
The measure of average substantial shareholding alone as an indicator of ownership 
structure would be imperfect. It would be possible to arrive at a relatively high average 
substantial holding of, for example, 10% with one shareholder holding 10% of the 
shares. The remaining 90% could be held by numerous small shareholders. The same 
average substantial shareholding of 10% could be shown for a company with, for 
example, 6 substantial shareholders holding 10% each. The six shareholders in the 
second example would command 60% of the shares between them. Two substantially 
different situations that indicate different power sharing scenarios. Therefore, freefloat 
as another predictor is introduced. Freefloat measures the percentage of shares not held 
by substantial shareholders. Higher values of this predictor indicate more diffused 
power. Again, institutional investors may present a caveat in the argument.4. The 
research hypothesis is as follows: 
H8: Freefloat is positively related to risk disclosure 
 
 
2.14 Predictor: Internal Audit 
The last structural predictor is internal audit. The predictor is a dichotomous measure. 
Value one was recorded for the presence of an internal audit function, or nil for no 
internal audit function. Neither the Combined Code nor other guidance explicitly 
defines the exact functions of the internal audit function. It is left to the individual 
business to define what exactly the internal audit function entails and how it is fitted 
into the organisation. Since this study does not measure quality but quantity a 
categorical approach was chosen. Inchausti (1993), Singhvi and Desai (1971) and 
Raffournier (1995), as opposed to Firth (1979), found a positive relationship between 
audit (firms) and disclosure. This relationship has not been researched very extensively. 
However, findings from earlier studies, as well as strong support from agency and 
signalling theory coupled with some support from political cost theory sufficiently 
support the inclusion of this variable.  
                                                 
4 Please see a more detailed discussion on institutional shareholder activism below. 
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H9: Internal Audit is positively related to risk disclosure. 
 
2.15 Predictor: Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) 
From the very early studies, scholars have used performance as a predictor of disclosure. 
Cerf (1961) being possibly the first one, Lang and Lundholm (1993) found higher 
disclosure scores for companies that perform well. Such a positive correlation is not 
obvious. Shareholders might be less suspicious and lenders might have a reduced need 
for information when a company performs well. Particularly if it performs well over a 
sustained period of time. Consequently, Singhvi and Desai (1971) found earnings 
margin an insignificant predictor. When a company is not performing well or is wealth 
destructive, a positive relation becomes even more difficult to explain. A loss making 
company, or a company in distress should increase disclosure in order to reduce 
information asymmetry, increase transparency, reduce uncertainty in risk estimations by 
lenders, maintain or improve liquidity and consequently reduce cost of capital. Skinner 
(1994), in fact, did find that firms disclose information pre-empting bad news.  
 
The findings of the previous studies could be explained, however, with signalling theory. 
Companies performing well might use this opportunity to signal their success to the 
market by increasing their disclosures. Grossmann (1981), Milgrom (1981), Verrecchia 
(1983) and Dye (1986) all supported this line of thought. Trueman (1986) argued that 
firms would signal superior management 
 
Company performance, i.e. success, can is defined in many different ways. This paper 
concentrates on profitability as calculated by accountants. All other aspects of success, 
e.g. triple bottom line, and similar concepts of non-accounted for or non-financial 
success are left to the side. The research hypothesis is as follows: 
H10: ROCE is positively related to risk disclosure. 
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Table 1 – Previous important research 
Citation Country Sample  Index Significant 
predictors 
Insignificant 
predictors 
Singhvi 
and Desai 
(1971) 
USA 100 listed 
companies 
plus 55 
unlisted 
companies  
34 items 
similar to 
Cerf (1961) 
Measuring 
Quality 
Listing status 
(categorical) 
 
Earnings 
margin 
Total Assets 
Number of 
stockholders 
CPA firm 
(dichotomous 
size measure) 
Rate of Return 
Buzby 
(1975) 
(Non-
parametric 
model) 
USA 44 listed 
companies 
plus 44 
companies 
with 
shares 
traded 
‘over the 
counter’ 
39 weighted 
items based 
on survey. 
Measuring 
quantity as 
well as 
quality 
Asset size Listing status 
Stanga 
(1976) 
USA 80 
companies 
named in 
‘Fortune 
1000’ list. 
79 weighted 
items based 
on survey 
Industry sector Net sales 
(Stanga (1976) 
hypothesised 
that the net 
sales of all 
Fortune 1000 
companies had 
too little 
variance to be 
significant) 
McNally et 
al. (1982) 
New 
Zealand 
103 listed 
companies 
41 weighted 
items based 
on survey 
Measuring 
quantity and 
quality 
Size (total 
assets) 
Rate of return 
(net income - 
total assets 
ratio) 
Growth (total 
assets) 
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Citation Country Sample  Index Significant 
predictors 
Insignificant 
predictors 
Lang and 
Lundholm 
(1993) 
US 751 
companies 
Rating of 
Financial 
Analysts 
Federation 
Corporation 
Size 
Performance 
Weak relation 
between stock 
return and 
earnings 
Security 
issuance 
Return 
variability 
Hossain et 
al. (1995) 
New 
Zealand 
40 listed 
New 
Zealand 
companies 
randomly 
selected 
plus all 15 
firms 
listed in 
New 
Zealand 
and 
overseas 
95 
unweighted 
items based 
on prior 
research 
Size (total 
assets) 
Foreign Listing 
Leverage 
Assets-in-place 
(net fixed 
assets to total 
assets) 
Type of auditor 
(dichotomous 
Big 6 or not) 
 
Meek et al. 
(1995) 
US, UK 
France, 
Germany, 
and The 
Netherlands 
116 US, 
64 UK, 16 
French, 
12 
German, 
and 18 
Dutch 
companies 
selected 
from 
Business 
Week 
1000, 
Financial 
Times UK 
Top 500, 
and 
Financial 
Times 
European 
Top 500 
85 
unweighted 
items  
Size 
Country 
Listing status 
Industry 
Leverage 
Multinationality 
Profitability 
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Citation Country Sample  Index Significant 
predictors 
Insignificant 
predictors 
Raffournier 
(1995) 
Switzerland 161 
companies 
24 or 30 
items for 
individual 
company or 
consolidated 
group 
reports 
respectively. 
Size 
Internationality 
Leverage 
Profitability 
Ownership 
structure 
Auditor’s size 
Percentage of 
fixed assets 
Industry Type 
Gray et al. 
(1995) 
US and UK 116 US 
and 64 
UK listed 
companies 
128 
unweighted 
items 
Listing status 
(listed 
internationally 
vs. nationally) 
Country 
 
Inchausti 
(1997) 
Spain 49 
companies 
50 
unweighted 
items 
Size (total 
assets & sales) 
Auditing 
(dichotomous 
for audited by 
Big 6) 
Stock 
exchange 
(dichotomous 
for listed on 
more than one 
stock 
exchange) 
Profitability 
Leverage 
Patton and 
Zelenka 
(1997) 
Czech 
Republic 
50 stock 
listed 
companies 
37 
unweighted 
items in 
‘narrow 
index’, 12 
items in 
‘somewhat 
broader 
index’, and 
17 items in 
‘broad’ 
index 
Type of 
auditor 
(dichotomous 
for Big 6) 
Number of 
employees 
Listing status 
Return on 
equity 
Total assets 
Industry 
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Citation Country Sample  Index Significant 
predictors 
Insignificant 
predictors 
Cooke 
(1989a) 
Sweden 90 listed 
and 
unlisted 
companies 
224 
unweighted 
items 
Size (irrelevant 
whether 
measured as 
total assets, 
sales, or 
number of 
shareholders 
Listing status 
 
Parent 
company 
relationship 
Schadewitz 
and Blevins 
(1998) 
Finland 256 
interim 
reports 
29 
unweighted 
items 
Business risk 
Capital 
Structure 
Size 
Market 
maturity 
Governance 
Growth 
 
Market Risk 
Stock Price 
Adjustment  
Ferguson 
et al. 
(2002) 
Hong Kong 142 listed 
companies 
93 
unweighted 
items 
Firm type 
Size 
Leverage 
Industry 
Multiple-listing 
status 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter the disclosure measurement is developed and described. It is also 
explained how the sampling frame was developed, a sample drawn and the data 
gathered. Finally, the rationale behind the exclusion of outliers is explained here. 
 
This paper endeavours to explain which determinants influence corporations in their 
decision to disclose information to the public relating to their risk management and 
internal control. This information cannot be measured directly (Cooke and Wallace 
1989 cited Hossain et al. 1995). In 1999, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW) published a survey (ICAEW, 1999) into the disclosure of 
risk related information. They used the disclosures made in the prospectuses of 
companies before the initial public offering of shares at the LSE as a benchmark to 
measure information content of annual reports published by the respective company at 
a later date. More often researchers adopted a different approach to overcome the same 
problem. They developed indices as a common measure of information content. The 
two main advantages over the methodology adopted by the ICAEW is that information 
content can be measured independently of the maturity of the company and against a 
common benchmark. Information content in previous studies measured either quality 
or quantity or a mixture of both.  
 
The single most important motivation for adopting an index-based approach in this 
paper is that it allows quantitative, correlational research (Kumar 1999); a research at 
one extreme of the continuum between the quantitative and qualitative paradigm. 
Cresswell (1994 cited Collis and Hussey 2003) argued that, according to the axiological 
assumptions, quantitative research leads to accurate and reliable results through validity 
and reliability rather than through verification as in a qualitative research. It was 
therefore possible for the single researcher of this paper to base the deductive process 
of drawing conclusions on accurate and reliable findings. 
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3.1 Index development 
Scholars in the field have used various forms of indices. Two basic variations are used. 
self-constructed and standardised index models from bodies like the Financial Analysis 
Federation, used for instance by Lang and Lundholm (1993), Standard & Poor’s 
Transparency and Disclosure Index, used for instance by Khanna et al (2003) and the 
Association for Investment Management and Research5, used for instance by Welker 
(1995). The main advantage of these standardised indices is that they lead to comparably 
easy to repeat results.  
 
This study focuses on information disclosed in form of narrative risk disclosures it is in 
this respect different to most other previous studies. Previous studies defined disclosure 
broadly in order to capture data as completely as possible. All information; financial, 
non-financial, pictorial, performance, quantitative and qualitative, etc. was captured. 
Even though the study is restricted to narrative statements the data encountered is still 
very rich. Almost any narrative statement contained in an annual report could be read in 
the context of risk management. It would be nearly impossible to gather all this rich 
data, to structure, compile and compare it. The index for this study is to narrow the 
information and make it comparable. The majority of researchers used their own self-
constructed index. Usually the aim is to gain content validity but comparability, becomes 
difficult. Wallace (1988) tried to standardise the indices used in previous studies, so that 
the outcome can be compared and in this way better understood.  
 
In order to maximise statistical power, this study concentrates on a narrow segment of 
the market, on a narrower form of disclosure and on information available at present.  
Comparability with other studies is not a prime objective.  
                                                 
5 Which is part of the Financial Analysis Federation 
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Patton and Zelenka (1997) suggested four possible approaches to develop a theoretical 
concept: 
(a) Have a normative decision model against which disclosures should be 
benchmarked for their usefulness 
(b) Use the evaluation of of annual reports by knowledgeable analysts to assess 
quality of disclosures 
(c) Assessing market reaction to extent of disclosures 
(d) Extent of compliance with a set of legal or GAAP requirements 
This paper uses the Turnbull Guidance and the Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 13 
(Kirk 2004) as a basis for the index; following the fourth suggestion by Patton and 
Zelenka (1997).  
 
Following the approach of Solomon et al. (2000), this study uses the Turnbull Guidance, 
which is solely concerned with risk management and internal control, and the relevant 
Financial Reporting Standard. FRS 13 makes a narrative statement relating to risks from 
derivatives and policies adopted to manage these risks mandatory. This effectively 
removes the decision as to which information should or could be understood in 
connection with risk management, and hence secures content validity as explained by 
Muijs (2004).  
 
In contrast to many previous studies, such as Meek et al. (1995), Cooke, (1989b) and 
Raffounrier (1995), no differentiation has been made between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that the increasing level of mandatory 
disclosures result in inconclusive empirical results. It is possible to receive data that 
mirror the extent of disclosures more accurately by disregarding the distinction between 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Also, the inclusion does not distort the results in 
this study. Companies which did not comply with mandatory disclosure requirements 
received, ceteris paribus, a lower index score mirroring the lower level of information 
available from the sampled units. If all companies complied, the effect from inclusion 
would be neutral. Considering the above described de facto self-regulation the 
determinants for mandatory disclosures may not be dissimilar from voluntary 
disclosures. Comparability could, however, suffer from the inclusion. This is an 
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opportune trade-off since this study is, with its narrow sampling population and self-
constructed index, limited by design, and comparability is not desired.  
 
 
3.2 Index Description 
Earlier researchers used weighted indices. However, Lang and Lundholm (1993) 
proposed that the weights are usually based on analysts’ ratings and are therefore biased. 
Later literature, such as Patton and Zelenka (1997), used indices with unweighted items. 
This approach assumes that all disclosures are equally important. Cooke (1989b) argued 
that unweighted indices are the appropriate research instrument when disclosures to all 
users of annual reports are studied. Different users might add different importance to 
different items. Neither the Turnbull Guidance nor FRS 13 attaches different priorities 
to any of their provisions. Other researchers saw less importance in the question 
whether or not to weigh an index in their studies. They did not expect different 
outcomes regardless whether weighted or unweighted indices are used. Robbins and 
Austin (1986), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Grey et al. (1995) suggested that no 
matter whether a weighted or unweighted index is chosen, the ranking of companies 
based on scores remains the same. Ferguson et al (2002) supported this argument with 
their conclusion that unweighted indices give almost the same results as weighted 
indices. 
 
Some of the provisions of the Turnbull Guidance only apply to organisations with an 
internal audit function, some other provisions are applicable to companies without 
internal audit. The index is constructed in such a way that irrespective of the presence or 
absence of an internal audit function the same maximum of 71 items could be awarded. 
Botosan (1997, p.333) noted that there is a possibility that larger and more complex 
organisations have more opportunity to disclose information, simply because of their 
higher complexity. This was carefully considered when the index was constructed. For 
example, ‘Disclosed’ was recorded for items that applied to larger or more complex 
organisations, such as the application of internal control systems to all joint-ventures 
and associates, when either such statement was made or a statement was made that no 
such joint-ventures exist. See Table 6 in Appendix A Item 64 and 66 to 68. 
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The provisions of the Turnbull Guidance and FRS 13 were distilled into 71 items that 
could be disclosed relating to the separate parts of the respective articles. See Table 6 in 
Appendix A for a complete list of items. The items were not weighted and data gathered 
dichotomously.  
 
 
3.3 Data Collecting Process 
Secondary data from annual reports was collected. Since information is rich, language 
can be used differently and sometimes allows different ways of interpretation. This 
study interpreted information narrowly. ‘Disclosed’ was only recorded when the item 
was explicitly mentioned in the annual report. The method of scoring was a 
dichotomous procedure. A sampling unit was awarded 1 for an item disclosed and 0 for 
not disclosed. The score was then divided by 71, the maximum possible items that could 
be disclosed by any one unit. The majority of studies followed this procedure; Cerf 
(1961), Singvhi and Desai (1971), and Gray et al. (1995) to name but a few.  
 
 
3.4 Sample Population 
The Combined Code applies to all companies in the UK. The code should provide 
guidance to companies but is not obligatory. Sec. 17.19(a) and 23.46 of the LSE’s listing 
rules and Section 7 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 make it compulsory 
for all companies in the UK to comply with the Combined Code. However, only  listed 
companies are obliged to publish their annual reports. Therefore, the population was 
narrowed to listed UK companies. This should provide a higher degree of certainty that 
the data gathered was easily and readily available. 1,486 companies fulfilled above 
criteria in August 2004 (LSE 2004). The number of sample units required to construct a 
meaningful sample would have exceeded the limits of this study. Especially considering, 
that Stanga (1976) argued in favour of a correlation between industrial sector and 
disclosure. Furthermore, it would be difficult to measure disclosure coherently for 
highly regulated sectors, e.g. banks, insurances, etc, and unregulated businesses 
simultaneously. Buzby (1075) and Firth (1979) explicitly excluded these sectors from 
their research.  
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Companies listed under the business support and services sector were chosen as the 
sampling population. Unlike other sectors, by definition business support and services 
include companies as diverse as architectural and design services, health and safety 
equipment suppliers, office stationary, or tool hire. The diverse business activities and 
backgrounds of companies in this sector should partly setoff effects as found by Stanga 
(1976) and others. Although, findings will not be representative of other companies 
outside the sample population, they should be less affected by unique business activity 
relating determinants. By choosing business support and services sector the statistical 
power was enhanced and industry effects minimized. 71 companies were listed under 
this sector (LSE, 2004).  
 
 
3.5 Annual Reports 
The data was to be lifted from the latest available annual reports. Many previous studies 
concentrated on annual reports, mainly because annual reports represent the most 
coherent in-depth information regularly published by companies, and contain 
mandatory as well as voluntary information. 
 
 
3.6 Sample size 
Because the backgrounds of the sampling units were diverse, it was decided to select a 
relatively large sampling size. 50 sampling units were to be selected, representing an 
initial probability of 70.43%. The sample was drawn following Johnson and 
Bhattacharyya’s (2001) suggestions of simple random sampling with no replacement. 
Kalton (1983) argued that this technique could be flawed by technicalities of the draw. 
This effect was offset by the initial high probability of being drawn (the probability 
dropped in the process to 4.76% for the last draw). Table 7 in Appendix C provides a 
list of the selected sample in the order of the draw.  
 
Of the 50 selected companies two companies’ annual reports did not contain all 
required data. Danka Business was allowed by the LSE to report pursuant to foreign 
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reporting regulation. Subsequently, the Turnbull Guidance and FRS 13 were not 
followed and the information required was not available. The other Company included 
in the sample with insufficient information was Office2Office. The latest available 
annual report was for the accounting year 2003, preceding their first year of being listed 
at the stock exchange. The company did not have to comply with the listing rules for 
the reported year. Further calculations were based on a sample size of 48 sample units6. 
 
 
3.7 Outliers 
One sample unit may influence the outcome of an analysis more significantly than 
others, especially in smaller samples. Scholars are divided about how these outliers 
should be treated.  
 
Norusis (2004) argued, that the outliers should not be eliminated from samples, as they 
represent a valid member of a sample population. Hinton et al(2004), Collis and Hussey 
(2003) and others argued that outliers, in fact, should be eliminated if they improve the 
statistical models and the conclusion drawn from them. Eliminating outliers is clearly a 
decision that should not be taken lightly. Both arguments have to be weighted up. In 
this study it must be considered that eliminations from the sample reduces an already 
small sample size.  
 
A preliminary regression was calculated to carry out a series of tests suggested by 
Norusis (2004). These tests showed two outliers that excessively influenced the outcome 
of the regression. See Graphs 1 and 2 in Appendix C for Cook’s Distance shown in a 
scatter plot and standardised residual values of outliers. Compared to the other sample 
units, Infast Group is a small business. It does, however, by far exceed the predicted 
index value. The sample unit reports that, during the accounting period, they suffered 
losses through a management error. This might have influenced their disclosure 
behaviour significantly. The other extreme is Corporate Services Group. They 
underwent a debt-equity swap and a major restructuring during the reporting period. 
This included extraordinary meetings with shareholders as well as lenders and certainly 
                                                 
6 Two units were removed from the sample later: Please see below. 
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required a considerable amount of communication. This might have lessened the need 
to disclose information in the annual report. This is interesting if understood in the 
context of above outlined O’Donovan’s (2002) argument. Perhaps his argument can be 
extended to disclosure more generally.  
 
After weighing up the arguments, both companies were eliminated from the sample. 
The sample size was reduced to 46. 
 
 
3.8 Parameter Assumption of Linear Multiple Regression 
Norusis (2004) explained that in order to test hypotheses about a population using 
multiple models four assumptions must be met by a random sample: (1) the 
observations are independent, (2) the relationship between the dependent and the 
predictor variable is linear, (3) for each value of the independent variables, there must be 
a normal distribution of values of the dependent variable (homoscedasticity), and (4) the 
distributions have the same variance. 
 
Hinton et al. (2004), Norusis (2004), Johnson and Bhattacharyya (2001) amongst others 
suggest strongly using non-parametric tests instead if the assumptions are violated. The 
sample data was examined in a series of tests as suggested by Norusis (2004). None of 
the assumptions above posed a serious problem to the validity of the results. 
Collinearity is discussed in Chapter 4. Conclusions, Summary and Further Research. 
 
Following most former studies the method of the least squares as explained by Johnson 
and Bhattacharyya (2001) was followed for the regression. The regression itself was 
calculated in SPSS using the method ENTER; forcing all predictor variables to enter the 
calculations simultaneously. 
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3.9 Short summary of Variables 
Table 2 shows a short summary of all variables and how they were calculated. Literature 
suggests using as few predictor variables as possible. Excessive use of predictors 
improves mathematical results but make it more difficult to infer useful conclusions 
from it. Table 2 also shows the variable category for each variable. Norusis (2004) said 
that the multiple regression models cope with different variable types. Although he 
recommends using continuous variables, it is possible to use lower grades of variables 
such as ordinal or even categorical variables.  
 
 
3.10 Summary of Methodology 
A positivistic approach was adopted for this research. It enabled the single researcher to 
arrive at accurate and reliable findings. As validity and reliability are paramount in this 
endeavour, a disclosure index was developed based on the Turnbull Guidance and FRS 
13 ensuring content validity. The index was constructed in a simplistic manner with a 
narrow interpretation of the narrative statements in annual reports in order to strive for 
reliability. Secondary data was collected from annual reports because of the availability 
and reliability. A theoretical framework was developed as basis for both the predictor 
variables and conclusions drawn from the linear regression models. 
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Table 2 Variables and definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Index 
(Dependent) 
Number of disclosures per sample unit divided by 71, the 
maximum possible disclosures.  
Ordinal variable but treated as continuous (Field, 2000). 
Audit committee size 
(Predictor) 
The number of members in the audit committee of the sample 
unit. 
Audit Committee = Audit committee size in absolute numbers. 
Ordinal variable. 
Average subst shareh 
(Predictor) 
Ratio of total percentage of equity capital held by substantial 
shareholders, i.e. holding is min. 3% of equity capital, divided by 
their number.  
Continuous variable. 
Capital Employed 
(Predictor) 
Ratio calculated form the published balance sheet of the sample 
unit in pursuant to ACCA standard. 
Capital employed = Total assets minus current liabilities 
Continuous variable. 
Freefloat 
(Predictor) 
The percentage of equity capital held by shareholders other than 
substantial shareholders. 
Continuous variable. 
Gearing 
(Predictor) 
Ratio calculated form the published balance sheet of the sample 
unit pursuant to ACCA standard.  
Gearing = creditors over one year / (shareholder funds + 
creditors over one year) 
Continuous variable 
iNed-Ratio 
(Predictor) 
Ratio of Independent Non-Executive Directors to total number 
of members of the audit committee. 
Continuous variable.  
Internal Audit 
(Predictor) 
Presence or absence of an internal audit function in a sample 
unit. 
Categorical (dichotomous) variable. 
NED-Ratio 
(Predictor) 
Ratio of Non-Executive Director to number of members of the 
board. 
Continuous variable. 
ROCE 
(Predictor) 
Ratio calculated form the published balance sheet of the sample 
unit pursuant to ACCA standard. 
Continuous variable. 
Turnover 
(Predictor) 
Turnover as disclosed in the balance sheet of the sample unit.  
Continuous variable. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS, SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The forth chapter contains the findings of the study and their analyses. The middle 
section provides a summary of this paper, its limitations, and suggestions for further 
research. 
 
As this paper endeavours to explain the determinants of disclosures concerning risk 
management and internal control, it is important to avoid partial correlations between 
the predictors. Although Gujarati (1988) suggests that correlations should not be 
regarded harmful unless they exceed 0.8 or 0.9, any significant multicollinearity would 
pose the problem of determining which of the correlating predictors is the important 
one. Since it is expected that the two size predictors, turnover and capital employed, are 
expected to correlate strongly, two regression models were calculated with one size 
predictor each. Model 1 includes capital employed, Model 2 includes Turnover as proxy 
for size. 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistic 
From the descriptive statistic in Table 3 it can be seen that the standard deviations do 
not indicate a large spread in most of the variables. The exceptions are the two size 
variables Turnover and Capital Employed. The high standard deviation in the size 
predictors negatively affect accuracy of the regression models. Table 3 indicates that, on 
average, the companies in the sample disclosed 0.34 of all possible disclosures with a 
variance from 0.15 for the lowest and 0.54 the highest score. In the absence of 
comparison, it is impossible to evaluate this finding. The fact that most companies 
disclose summarized information or conclusions rather then the underlying raw 
information or even quantitative risk measurements (Solomon et al. 2000) is further 
diffusing the meaning of this statistic. Summarized information may have not lead to a 
‘disclosed’ score of an index item. 
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It is equally notable, that approximately 61% of equity capital, on average, was held by 
atomistic shareholders, whereas substantial shareholders held approximately 8% of 
equity capital on average. Substantial shareholders in the sample generally represented 
large minority shareholders, who are of course able to exercise controlling power, 
depending on the composition of the remaining shareholders. 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
    Mean Std. Deviation N 
Model 1 Index 0.3353 0.0995 46
  Audit Committee size 3.2609 0.9294 46
  Average subst shareh 0.0767 0.0422 46
  Capital Employed 142,743.6087 300,342.2992 46
  Freefloat 0.6096 0.2062 46
  Gearing 0.3578 0.2846 46
  iNED-Ratio 0.9203 0.1739 46
  Internal Audit 0.6304 0.4880 46
  NED-ratio 0.5336 0.1372 46
  ROCE 0.0426 0.2395 46
Model 2 Index 0.3353 0.0995 46
  Audit Committee size 3.2609 0.9294 46
  Average subst shareh 0.0767 0.0422 46
  Freefloat 0.6096 0.2062 46
  Gearing 0.3578 0.2846 46
  iNED-Ratio 0.9203 0.1739 46
  Internal Audit 0.6304 0.4880 46
  NED-ratio 0.5336 0.1372 46
  ROCE 0.0426 0.2395 46
  Turnover 123,684.6739 223,588.3099 46
 
 
4.2 Model analysis – Model 1 
The Pearson correlation coefficient, or as it is sometimes referred to, the Pearson’s 
product moment correlation R is a measure of change of one variable when another 
variable changes its value. It represents the absolute value of multiple correlation 
coefficient. The value R=0.6696 (Table 4 Panel A) for Model 1, using capital employed 
as size predictor, indicates a strong positive relationship between the dependent variable 
and the predictors.  
 37 
Table 4 Model summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate F Sig. 
1 0.6696 0.4483 0.3104 0.0826 3.25092 0.005467
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model Variable B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 
-
0.0560 0.1069  -0.5236 0.6038
Audit Committee size 
-
0.0022 0.0177 -0.0208 -0.1258 0.9006
Average subst 
shareh 0.8948 0.3905 0.3800 2.2914 0.0279
Capital Employed 0.0000 0.0000 0.3174 2.5030 0.0170
Freefloat 0.1202 0.0845 0.2491 1.4221 0.1636
Gearing 0.0369 0.0493 0.1057 0.7490 0.4587
iNED-Ratio 0.1351 0.0736 0.2362 1.8359 0.0746
Internal Audit 0.0543 0.0298 0.2662 1.8224 0.0767
NED-ratio 0.1320 0.1127 0.1821 1.1711 0.2493
1 
ROCE 
-
0.0143 0.0529 -0.0344 -0.2703 0.7885
 
 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate F Sig. 
2 0.6659 0.4434 0.3042 0.0830 3.18598 0.006212
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model Variable B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) -0.0620 0.1072  -0.5777 0.5671
Audit Committee size -0.0055 0.0178 -0.0510 -0.3059 0.7615
Average subst shareh 0.7967 0.3956 0.3384 2.0140 0.0515
Turnover 0.0000 0.0000 0.3101 2.4262 0.0204
Freefloat 0.1262 0.0846 0.2617 1.4915 0.1445
Gearing 0.0432 0.0495 0.1236 0.8733 0.3883
iNED-Ratio 0.1387 0.0738 0.2424 1.8796 0.0683
Internal Audit 0.0536 0.0299 0.2629 1.7921 0.0815
NED-ratio 0.1566 0.1142 0.2161 1.3716 0.1787
2 
ROCE -0.0132 0.0531 -0.0318 -0.2486 0.8051
 
However, there are differences between predicted values for index and observed values. 
R Square gives the proportion of variance that can be explained by a model. R 
Square=0.4483 in Model 1 (Table 4 Panel A) means that 44.8% of changes in the 
dependent variable can be explained by changes in the predictor variables. The adjusted 
value of Model 1 adjR Square=0.3104 gives an estimation of how well the model would 
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
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fit another set of data from the same population. In other words, it is estimated that if 
other sample units were drawn, the same model would explain 31% of the variance of 
the dependent variable. This is because the intercept and the slope are based on the data 
set of this study and therefore fit that data set somewhat better than it would another 
sample. Norusis (2004) suggests that this adjusted value should be considered for 
models with many predictors. The adjusted R Square Value is significantly lower than R 
Square. This could be an effect caused by the relatively high number of predictors. A 
fact that will be explored in more detail below. The Standard Error of the Estimate is an 
estimation of the variability of the multiple regression measured in standard deviations. 
The value 0.0826 indicates a small spread of variability.  
 
 
4.3 Model Analysis – Model 2 
Model 2, using turnover as size measure, delivered equally respectable results, although 
fairing a little behind Model 1. Table 4 Panel B shows R=0.6659 indicating a similarly 
strong positive correlation between dependent and predictor variables. The R Square 
value in Table 4 Panel B is R Square=0.4434 and again only very slightly below Model 1. 
The adjusted R Square Value of adjR Square=0.3042 is 0.0062 lower than Model 2. 
Standard Error of the Estimate is very similar to Model 1. 
 
It is impossible to infer any useful conclusions from the small differences in both 
models. What does become clear, is that the impact of using the two different size 
predictors does not lead to substantially different results and subsequently different 
conclusions. 
 
 
4.4 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests the significance of the regression models. 
Significance testing has evolved from the question whether the observations were made 
by chance. Significance has a different meaning in statistics than in daily life (Mujis, 
2004). Significance in statistics is a measure of the probability of not finding an effect in 
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the population when there is one in the sample. Table 4 Panel A shows the Significance 
as p=0.005 in Model 1 and p=0.006 in Table 4 Panel B for Model 2. That means that 
there is less than 1% probability in both models that the correlation effects on which 
this regression model is based are not present in the population.  
 
Mujis (2004), as well as Hinton at al. (2004) along with many others suggest that 
commonly a 5% or lower significance level is recognised as threshold to accept 
significance. Setting a higher level increases the probability that the observed effect in 
the sample is not present in the sample population. This could lead to a Type I error. 
That is, rejecting the null hypothesis when in fact there is no effect in the population. 
Setting a lower threshold increases the risk that the null hypothesis is not rejected when, 
in fact, there is an effect in the sample population; a Type II error. A significance of  
0.5 % and 1% as in this study would provide a firm basis to reject the null hypothesis 
and accept the research hypotheses.  
 
Significance testing is not without criticism. In studies like this, with a small sample, the 
difference between, for instance, p=.049 and p=.051 with a threshold set at p=.05 can 
be one value in a data set. Muijs (2004) put forward the argument that relationships with 
a correlation coefficient of 0 very rarely occur. Some correlation, according to his 
argument, is found most of the times. He describes this as the universal crud factor. 
Bearing this in mind, the significance factor in this study should be interpreted with 
caution. This will become apparent in the later discussion below.  
 
Although the sample is small, the number of predictors is high and consequently the 
possibility to find correlations as well. These correlations vary in strength and might 
even vary in direction. Since ANOVA is calculated with nine predictor variables in this 
study, it loses some of its validity. Muijs (2004) and Norusis (2004) suggested using 
confidence intervals instead. Confidence intervals give a lower and upper limit, between 
which a value can vary, since the value of the population is not known. The spread of 
the interval then depends on the required confidence level. The higher the confidence 
value between the lower and the upper limit, the wider the spread need to be. The other 
important measure to supplement significance is effect size. Effect size looks at the 
impact of a statistic. The question asked by this line of thought is whether the described 
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effect is large enough to pursue it further or draw useful conclusions from it. Effect size 
indices can be compared with results of other studies. The effect size is measured in the 
F-Test and can be seen in Table 4 Panel A as F=3.251, and in Panel B as 3.186 for 
Model 1 and Model 2 respectively. Muijs (2004) suggests classifying both values as a 
modestly strong effect size. R Square value, effect size and significance suggest that 
there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. This will be looked at later 
when the data is analysed in more depth. 
 
 
4.5 T-Test 
Table 4 Panel A and B contain information about the strength (the slope) and direction 
of correlation between individual predictors and the index. For a change of one unit in 
the dependent variable, the predictor variable changes its value by the figure given under 
B, provided that all other predictor values remain constant. Beta also provides 
information about the slope. But the information is standardized. Under Beta the 
figures show the change in the dependent variable’s value for a change of one standard 
deviation in the respective predictor variable, provided that all other predictor variables 
are held constant. The values become comparable. Since all predictors influence the 
outcome in various strength it would be wrong to draw conclusions as to the correlation 
of the predictor and the index in isolation.  
 
The T-Test is calculated as the slope B divided by the standard error. The steeper the 
slope and the smaller the standard error, the higher the value of t. In this paper the value 
of t is used to measure the contribution of the variable to the regression model. Field 
(2000) suggested using Beta, since the values provide information about the strength 
and direction of correlation between predictor and outcome at the same time. Whatever 
is used, the result remains the same.  
 
 
4.6 Analysis: Capital Employed 
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Capital employed is a significant predictor in Model 1. Table 4 Panel A shows this 
predictor with t=2.50 as the highest contributor to the outcome. Significance is 
p=0.017. The Pearson Correlation (partial correlation) in Table 8 of Appendix D 
between capital employed and index is positively and moderately strong, indicating that 
the quantity of relevant disclosure increases with this size proxy measurement. The 
finding is of statistical significance and can therefore be extrapolated to the entire 
sample population. Companies with larger capital employed listed under the business 
support and services sector of the LSE disclose more narrative risk-relating information 
than companies with smaller capital employed. 
 
The Finding size as the most influential predictor is consistent with previous research 
and not surprising. Size plays an important part in the context of all theories discussed 
in this paper and is discussed in detail above. 
 
 
4.7 Analysis: Turnover 
Turnover is the size predictor of Model 2. Table 4 Panel B shows t=2.462, again the 
most important predictor in the model. Significance is p=0.0204. Although lower than 
the size significance in Model 1, still well below 0.05. Above finding applies analogously. 
Companies listed under the business support and services sector with higher turnover 
disclose more information in narrative, risk management-relating information than 
companies with lower turnover, i.e. smaller companies. 
 
 
4.8 Analysis: Average substantial shareholding 
Average substantial shareholding was used in the context of agency theory, the Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) research, and as proximity variable for Ho and Wong’s (2001) 
concept of influential personalities. The predictor provided the second highest 
contribution in both models. Table 4 Panel A shows t=2.2914 and Panel B t=2.014. 
Significance in Model 1 is p=0.0279, well below the 0.05 threshold. In Model 2 
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significance is p=0.0515, just above the 0.05 level. This finding emphasises the problem 
with significance testing as discussed above.  
 
The correlation in the regression is positive. That means that higher average substantial 
shareholdings correlate with higher index values. Correlation, however, must not be 
equalled with causality (Graham 2003).  
 
The positive correlation is not intuitive. When a relatively small number of people hold 
a relatively large part of equity capital one could assume that they have other means of 
receiving information from the company than the annual report. It could be 
hypothesised that a few relatively powerful shareholders exercise stricter control than 
many shareholders with diffused power. This stricter control could lead to more 
information being disclosed to the more powerful shareholders. The company could 
then, for legal reasons as well as economic reasons, consequently choose to remove 
information asymmetry amongst their shareholders as well as between shareholders and 
the market. Information asymmetry, as argued above, can have negative effects on the 
cost of capital. 
 
The observed positive correlation add to the debate around institutional shareholder 
activism. The model in this study disregards institutional shareholdings completely. The 
model indicates that more information is available from companies with more 
concentrated shareholderings. Institutional investors, too, may be able to gain increased 
information about compliance to the Turnbull Guidance and FRS 13 from companies 
by exercising the power derived from proxy voting rights.  
 
 
4.9 Analysis: Freefloat 
In fact, there is an indication found for institutional shareholder activism. Annual 
reports do not usually report the percentage of voting rights controlled by institutional 
shareholders. It is likely that there is a strong positive correlation between freefloat and 
voting rights controlled by institutional shareholders. The predictor variable freefloat is 
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positively correlated to the outcome, but the finding is statistically insignificant. There is 
a 16% probability that correlation is not found in the sample population (Table 4 Panel 
A) in Model 1, and a 14% probability in Model 2 (Table 4 Panel B). Although 
extrapolation to the population may not be prudent, it indicates that some relation 
between atomistic shareholders and outcome exists, at least in the sample. It is 
interesting to note that the partial correlation between freefloat and index (Table 8 in 
Appendix D) is neutral. Again, this finding cannot be extrapolated to the entire sample 
population, but it raises questions as to how institutional investors influence disclosure 
behaviour.  
 
The Institutional Shareholder’s Committee (ISC) issued a Statement of Principles 
concerning the Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents (ISC 2002) in 
which they manifest their approach to institutional shareholder activism. In a 
conversation with Liz Murrall (personal communication, September 7 2004), Senior 
Advisor Corporate Governance, of the Investment Management Association (IMA), she 
emphasised the proactive approach their members took. In her survey of IMA members 
(Murrall 2003), 32 out of 33 respondents, representing 54% of the members’ funds 
under management, exercise all voting rights as a matter of policy; one only did if it felt 
it was necessary. All actively engaged with investee companies. Although this is not 
scientific research, it does indicate that fund managers do translate documents, such as 
the ISC’s Statement of Principles (ISC 2002) and, of course, the Combined Code into 
policies. The Hampel Report (Hampel 1998) recognised that institutional investors in 
the UK do have a role to play in controlling management. The Combined Code in its 
current version does have provisions for institutional shareholders. Section 2 of the 
Combined Code encourages institutional shareholders to engage with the investee 
company, evaluate governance disclosures and exercise their voting rights.  
 
The argument is not entirely consistent. Institutional shareholding does not 
automatically increase with free float. The ownership predictors also play a role in 
information asymmetry and capital cost theory, the company could be tempted to 
increase disclosure to avert adverse selection especially when their shareholders invest 
over the short-term rather than having a long-term interest. 
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4.10 Analysis: iNed-Ratio and Internal Audit 
Both models show two other predictors predominantly chosen because of agency 
theory as influential to the outcome; although not significant. The ratio of independent 
non-executive directors on the audit committee and Internal Audit. Both could be seen 
as the principals extended means to exercise control. 
 
This finding is rather interesting. The new Combined Code incorporated the Higgs 
Report which introduced the concept of independence of non-executive directors. 
There is no research on the impact of this new concept of independence on disclosures 
to date. Ho and Wong (2001) came closest when they studied the impact of 
independent directors, amongst other variables, on disclosures in Hong Kong.  
 
The finding in this study would indicate that the size of the audit committee is, in fact, 
less important than its make up. This could be an indication that the Higgs Report 
rightly recognised that independence of non-executive directors as important. Similarly, 
there is no empirical research on the effect of internal audits on disclosure. There is 
some research into the impact of audit on disclosure. Researchers such as Inchausti 
(1993) or Raffournier (1995) found correlations between audit companies and 
disclosure. Size of the audit firm was sometimes found as a relevant, significant 
predictor. This relation was found mostly by using a dichotomous predictor variable as 
to whether or not companies were audited by the leading auditors.  
 
The obvious explanation is that audit firms do in some way influence what the company 
discloses in the annual report. Although it is likely to be outside the mandate of the 
audit firm, some degree of influence might be exercised in what the company discloses 
in respect of their risk control mechanisms. There is no direct explanation for this 
effect, nonetheless, it was proven to exist in several studies. It was sometimes argued 
that more disclosure and the use of a globally reputable auditor indicates that the 
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company builds on signalling theory and signals superior conduct to the market 
(Inchausti 1997, p.55) or to the audit company itself.  
 
Internal audit is different in this respect. The signal of having an internal audit function 
is very likely not as strong as the use of a globally leading auditor and there is little sense 
in signalling to internal audit via the annual report. There are no provisions in the 
Turnbull Guidance or indeed in the Combined Code that define the functions and 
responsibilities of internal audit. There are no legal requirements for any business to 
have such function. It is left to the companies themselves to decide whether or not they 
wish to have an internal audit function and what their mandate is. The influence on 
what is or is not disclosed in the annual report is by no means obvious. Internal audits 
do not necessarily participate in the production of the annual report. Companies can 
choose whether their internal audit function is a welcome contribution in this process.  
 
When a company does maintain an internal audit function it seems likely that they have 
more highly developed and structured control systems and, more importantly, provide 
more reports about it. However, there is a considerable degree of uncertainty in this 
hypothesis as there is no scientific research verifying this argument.  
 
Another possible explanation would be, for instance, that bigger companies have 
internal audits and the results are caused by collinearity or coincidence. More in-depth 
research would be needed.  
 
 
4.11 Analysis: ROCE 
Profitability (ROCE) has little influence on outcome and is not significant (s. Table 4 
Panel A and B) in both models. Other studies have found that profitability positively 
relates to disclosure and significantly contributed to their models. Signalling theory was 
used as an explanation for this effect.  
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It was found that this does not hold true for information relating to risk controlling 
systems in both models. The correlation here is weakly negative. Which would mean 
that information decreases slightly as profitability increases. This discrepancy from 
earlier research could be interesting. Smith (1996) found that institutional shareholder 
activism increases when the company stock performance is low. It could be that 
companies respond to reduced information demand from their shareholders when they 
consider performance to be good. The survey of Solomon et al. (2000) found that 
institutional investors are not interested in actively involving themselves in the decision 
making process of the investee company. Also, they found that their attitude is more 
focused on not being caught out by unusual company performance which in turn would adversely 
affect portfolio performance. Murrall (personal communication, September 7, 2004) described 
a more proactive approach, but this is more anecdotal than scientific. This would 
support the argument that institutional investors might lessen their control activities 
when the company performs well.  
 
Aerni (1999) argued that profit is usually earned for accepting risk. Following this 
argument shareholders would have more reason to demand information about risk 
control systems for more profitable companies than for less profitable companies. This 
effect is, of course, partly setoff by the theory around cost of capital. Less profitable 
companies might choose to disclose more information to lower their cost of capital. An 
outcome caused by breakdown of internal risk management could be more severe for 
less profitable companies, since they might be less able to compensate with other profits 
for this loss. The downside risks might increase for less profitable companies. But 
nonetheless, finding that the outcome is almost unaffected by profitability in both 
models is inconsistent with some previous studies and potentially very interesting. 
 
 
4.12 Analysis: Gearing 
The importance of gearing varies in previous studies. This study found gearing weakly 
correlated to the outcome in both models (Table 4 Panel A and B). The contribution to 
the models was moderate and not significant. 
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The risks resulting from higher gearing are mainly financial in nature. Generally this is 
the ability to pay interest which is usually dependent on interest levels rather than 
financial success and cash in-flows. So, irrespective of the financial position, interest 
would have to be paid. The other risk is the dependence on the continued willingness of 
the lender to provide finance. The latter is very likely to depend largely on the perceived 
ability and willingness to pay interest and repay capital at maturity. Financial risk can be 
best assessed by analysis of numerical information contained in balance sheet, profit and 
loss account and cash-flow statement (Sengupta 1998). Therefore, gearing should not 
directly increase the need for more narrative disclosure. However, as discussed above, 
there is a transfer of wealth from shareholders to stakeholders, which could potentially 
raise the need for more disclosure. So, if lenders have no need for additional risk 
disclosures, i.e. information that is not already disclosed because of other demands the 
correlation coefficient remains close to zero as found in this study.  
 
4.13 Summary 
This study tries to establish the determinants of narrative disclosure concerning risk 
management and internal control. An Index was created based on the Turnbull 
Guidance and FRS 13. A sample of 46 UK companies listed on the LSE in the business 
support and services sector was selected. The predictor variables were chosen based on 
empirical research into voluntary disclosure behaviour. 
 
The literature report section of this study established the possibility for companies to 
tailor their corporate governance systems to their needs. Turnbull Guidance in particular 
does not contain very specific provisions concerning disclosures. This is exacerbated by 
the virtues of self-regulation, the comply or explain approach and not lenient regulation, 
it was also established that it is largely left to the company to decide which information 
about risk management systems and procedures are disclosed. 
 
Two regression models were calculated with nine predictor variables each. The size 
predictor variable was capital employed in Model 1 and turnover in Model 2. All other 
predictor variables were identical. Regression Model 1 was able to explain 44.8% of 
variance in the dependent variable by variance in the predictor variables. Model 2 
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explained 44.3%. This, as such, could mean that there are other determinants of 
disclosures which are not included into this model. Interesting to note in this context 
may be the two outliers excluded from the sample. In both cases something occurred 
during the reporting period that might have influenced disclosures. A failing of 
management in one case and major finance restructuring in the other. It is, of course, 
not proven that these facts influenced disclosure, but nevertheless it does give an 
indication that there can well be determinants not included into the model that have 
significant influence on disclosure behaviour. Especially in the fluid world of legitimacy 
theory, where determinants and their importance can vary over time.  
 
Both models showed a moderate but significant effect. The effect size of the Model 1 is 
F=3.250 with a significance of p=0.005.The effect size of Model 2 is F=3.186 with a 
significance of p=0.006. Since F is greater than 1 in both models, at least one of the 
predictor variables in each model must have a regression coefficient which is not nil and 
the statistical significance is at 0.01 level. Therefore, the results from the model can be 
extrapolated to the entire sample population. 
 
The paper confirmed that narrative statements from companies in the business support 
and services sector concerning risk management are similarly affected by size than 
voluntary disclosure in general. Size and narrative disclosure quantity are positively 
related in the business support and services sector. Almost all relevant theories attach 
importance to company size. Political cost and legitimacy theory may be very important 
as larger companies are more exposed to the media and more people are affected by 
their activities. 
 
The second significant predictor variable was average substantial shareholding. Some 
previous empirical research showed a relationship between ownership and disclosure 
behaviour. Average substantial shareholding was also an important predictor in both 
models but only in Model 1 below the significance level of 0.05. In Model 2 the 
significance was p=0.0515 just above the threshold.  Interestingly, Table 8 in Appendix 
D shows other significant partial correlations between predictors chosen mainly because 
of agency theory and Index. However, only the proxy-predictor for large minority 
shareholders was significant in the regression models. It could be argued that 
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institutional investors, controlling a large majority of equity capital in free float, have less 
influence on disclosure than concentrated shareholders. However, this paper can only 
provide an impetus for more research into the important discussion about shareholder 
activism. The neutral partial correlation found in the sample is not significant and can 
therefore be not expanded to the entire sample population, which would not be 
representative of the British economy anyway. Nonetheless, the predictor freefloat was 
found not significant whereas freefloat was significant.  
 
The following Table 5 shows the conclusions concerning research hypotheses based on 
the Pearson correlation model (Table 8 in Appendix D). 
 
Table 5 – Research Hypotheses  
Hypothesis Accepted/ 
Rejected 
Correlation 
coefficient  
Significance 
H1: Capital Employed is 
positively related to risk 
disclosure 
Accepted +0.356 0.008 
H2: Turnover is positively 
related to risk disclosure 
Accepted +0.356 0.008 
H3: Gearing is positively 
related to risk disclosure 
Accepted +0.346 0.009 
H4: NED-ratio is positively 
related to risk disclosure 
Rejected +0,197 Insignificant 
H5: Audit Committee size is 
positively related to risk 
disclosure 
Rejected +0.177 Insignificant 
H6: iNED-ratio is positively 
related to risk disclosure 
Accepted +0.316 0.016 
H7: Average Substantial 
Shareholding is positively 
related to risk disclosure 
Accepted +0.267 0.036 
H8: Freefloat is positively 
related to risk disclosure 
Rejected 0.027 Insignificant 
H9: Internal Audit is 
positively related to risk 
disclosure 
Accepted 0.301 0.021 
H10: ROCE is positively 
related to risk disclosure 
Rejected -0.106 Insignificant 
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4.14 Limitations 
Johnson and Bhattacharyya (2001) argue that devising a model, fitting the model by 
estimating the least squares, and testing hypothesis is only half the story. The sample data 
should be examined to test how well they comply with the parametric assumptions of 
linear multiple regression and this T-Test. Norusis Norusis (2004), Hinton et al. (2004) 
and others suggest examining residuals.  
 
The first assumption of independence of observations should not pose a problem in 
this model. Research designs where the data from the same sample units is collected 
repeatedly are more likely to suffer from observations that are not independent. As 
independence of data is given by design in this study, tests were omitted. 
 
Norusis (2004) devised a sequence of tests that can be performed to establish linearity 
of the relation between each predictor and dependent variable; assumption two. Also, 
normal distribution and consistent spread (variance) for each value of predictor variable; 
assumptions three and four, are suggested by him. There is some debate about the 
degree of violation of the assumptions necessary to adversely affect the outcome 
(Hinton et al. 2004). In this paper it is believed that the assumptions of linear regression 
and T-tests were not sufficiently violated to corrupt the outcome and hence the 
conclusions drawn from it. 
 
Since the scoring was undertaking by one tester, reliability is an inherent problem. 
Literature suggests several ways to increase reliability. Collis and Hussey (2003), for 
example, suggest a test re-test method, where the same survey is repeated and outcomes 
compared. This survey was conducted by only one assessor and a relatively small sample 
size. It is likely that the assessor would have remembered the score of the initial test and 
consequently corrupted the results of the re-test. Salkind (2004) suggests various internal 
consistency reliability models. Cronbach’s Alpha or Kuder-Richardson 20 and 21 are 
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named. Cronbach’s Alpha, for example, is based on the logic that a sample unit with an 
overall high score should score higher on each individual item and vice versa. The 
solution of Cronbach was to find correlation between each individual item with the 
overall score. The Index used in this survey, however, is based on categorical data, i.e. 
disclosed or not disclosed. Within the limits of this study a more practical way of 
enhancing reliability was chosen. Adopting a narrow interpretation of information and 
the simplistic construction of the index should avoid subjective information valuation 
and provide a higher degree of reliability. However, an element of subjectivity may not 
have been eliminated. 
 
Disclosures measured by the index are not to be taken as manifestations of underlying 
quality of risk management. Indeed, the index did not measure quality or importance of 
the narrative statements but simply quantity. It is equally important to note, that there 
might be information contained in narrative statements of annual reports that were 
considered to not explicitly relate to an item of the index, but still may have strong 
relevance to risk management. This effect may be exacerbated by the narrow 
interpretation of narrative statements adopted when scoring was undertaken. 
 
 
4.15 Further Research 
The conclusions drawn in this paper are valid for the business support and services 
sector. Although this sector contains companies with diverse background and business 
activity, it does not represent British businesses as a whole. This paper could provide an 
impetus for more empirical research into the extent and determinants of risk-relating 
disclosures on a larger scale. Research capturing a more complete picture of risk-relating 
reporting activity in Britain would be very useful. 
 
This study found that size is an important determinant of disclosure. It confirms that 
the reason for risk-relating narrative disclosure in this respect is not different from 
voluntary disclosures in general. The study, however, also proves that ownership 
structure, i.e. control mechanisms, have an impact on relevant disclosure. A 
phenomenological research, such as a case study, could explore in detail the underlying 
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influences of risk disclosure. Such qualitative study could give valuable additional 
information to help the interpretation of the observed correlations and more 
importantly the results of the regression models. 
 
In this study it was particularly difficult to evaluate the extent of information provided 
due to the absence of comparisons. Research should be undertaken into the extent of 
risk-related reporting in Britain as a whole. A comparison could be made with the 
information required by readers of annual reports; following considerations by Solomon 
et al. (2000).  
 
The findings could be of great importance to many practitioners in the field. The 
insights of scientific research would be of special interest to policy makers. In July 2004, 
a group was set up by the FRC to look at the Turnbull Guidance and update it if 
necessary. One focus of this review process will be to address the disclosure provisions. 
Attention to this was drawn by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (USA, 2002), which contains 
provisions for compulsory risk-relating reporting in great detail, including specific risks. 
The approach in the UK has been distinctly different in allowing companies more space 
for their own judgement. The decision of how to proceed in the future is of great 
importance to businesses in the UK. It also sets the tone of future regulation. To base 
such important decisions on scientific research rather than political process could hold 
distinct advantages. 
 
The importance of the of scientific knowledge about extent, quality and fit of risk-
relating disclosures to policy makers seems intuitive. But also knowledge about the 
determinants can be very useful to policymakers. Questions as to whether regulation 
should incorporate special provisions for small companies, or companies with 
concentrated ownership, large minority shareholders or without defined internal audit 
could be answered.  
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APPENDIX A  
Table 6 – Disclosure quantity index 
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Required statement narrative 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
1 M 5a) How the code was applied 42 
2 M 5b) Whether or not complied with throughout the reporting 
period 
44 
3 V 16) The board of directors are responsible for internal 
control 
45 
4 V 16) Seek regular assurance to satisfy itself that systems are 
functioning 
17 
5 V 17) Definition of what constitutes sound internal control 12 
6 V 17) Nature and extent of risk 5 
7 V 17) Extent and Categories of acceptable risks 3 
8 V 17) Likelihood of such risk 6 
9 V 17) The ability to reduce impact 6 
10 V 17) Cost/benefit of controlling risk 4 
11 V 18) Management should identify risk 29 
12 V 18) Management should evaluate risk 25 
13 V 18) Management has the knowledge and skill to operate the 
risk management system (RMS) 
8 
14 V 18) Management has the required information to operate 
the RMS 
14 
15 V  18) Management has the authority to operate the RMS 22 
16 V 19) Employees play their part in the RMS 9 
17 V 20) Internal control system encompasses policies, processes, 
tasks and behaviours 
10 
18 V 21) Internal control system (ICS) reflects control 
environment 
40 
19 V 21) ICS encompasses control activities 15 
20 V 21) ICS encompasses Info and communication processes 27 
21 V 21) ICS encompasses monitoring processes 24 
22 V 22) ICS is embedded in organisation 11 
23 V 22) ICS enables to respond quickly 4 
24 V 22) ICS allows possibility to report immediately to 
appropriate levels about weaknesses or failures 
8 
25 V 23) Acknowledgement that ICS cannot eliminate fraud, 
poor judgement, human error, management overriding 
controls, and occurrences of unforeseeable 
circumstances 
3 
 A2 
It
em
 
M
an
da
to
ry
/V
ol
un
ta
ry
 
Tu
rn
bu
ll 
Se
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Required statement narrative 
Fr
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y 
26 V 24) Acknowledgement that ICS cannot provide protection 
with certainty against a company failing to meet its 
objectives or all material errors losses, fraud or breaches 
of laws or regulations 
6 
27 V 25) Board forms its own opinion 10 
28 V 25) Management is a ccountable to the board for monitoring 
and provides assurance that it has done so 
17 
29 V 27) Management regularly receives and reviews reports on 
ICS 
23 
30 V 27) Board undertakes annual assessment before public 
disclosure 
15 
31 V 28) Board should not review all risks but include all types of 
controls; incl. such of operational nature 
23 
32 V 28) Board should not review all risks but include all types of 
controls; incl. such of compliance nature 
19 
33 V 28) Board should not review all risks but include all types of 
controls; incl. such of internal financial nature 
2 
34 V 29) Board defines processes how to review effectiveness 9 
35 V 29) This definition encompasses scope and frequency of 
reports received during the year and process of the 
annual assessment 
3 
36 V 29) The Board’s statement on ICS in annual report is 
supported by sound, appropriately documented reports  
2 
37 V 30) Reports from management to board are a balanced 
assessment of all significant risks 
4 
38 V 30) Reports from management to board are a balanced 
assessment of effectiveness of ICS in managing those 
risks 
5 
39 V 30) Reports form management to board discuss any 
significant control failing or weakness 
2 
40 V 30) Control failings or weaknesses contained in reports 
from management to board discuss impact that they had 
or could have had 
1 
41 V 30) Discuss actions taken to rectify control failings or 
weakness contained in reports from management to 
board 
4 
42 V 31) Board reviews during the year significant risks, 
identification and evaluation processes 
24 
43 V 31) Board assess during the year the effectiveness of ICS 
with emphasis on failings and weaknesses 
7 
44 V  31) Board reviews during the year whether rectification of 
failings or weaknesses was taken promptly 
3 
45 V 31) Board considers during the year whether more 
monitoring is required 
1 
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Required statement narrative 
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46 V 32) Board assesses, for the purpose of making its public 
statement on ICS, all reports reviewed during the year 
and any additional information  
6 
47 V 33) The board’s annual assessment included any changes 
since last year 
6 
48 V 33) The board’s annual assessment included scope and 
quality of monitoring 
4 
49 V 33) The board’s annual assessment included the extent of 
reports received from management 
2 
50 V 33) The board’s annual assessment included the frequency 
of reports received from management 
0 
51 V 33) The board’s annual assessment included significant 
failings and/or weakness their impact and management 
1 
52 V 33) The board’s annual assessment included the 
effectiveness of the company’s public reporting 
processes. 
1 
53 V 34) The board reviewed how failings or weaknesses arose 
and re-assessed the effectiveness of management’s 
ongoing processes for designing, operating and 
monitoring ICS 
1 
54 M 35) D.2 [now C.2] was applied 24 
55 M 35) There is an ongoing process for identifying, evaluating 
and managing significant risks 
38 
56 M 35) This process has been in place over the year and up to 
the date of approval of the annual report 
29 
57 M 35) This process is regularly reviewed by the board and 
accords with the Turnbull Guidance 
32 
58 M 37) Board is responsible for ICS and its reviews 41 
59 M  37) ICS is designed to manage and not to eliminate 31 
60 M 37) ICS provides reasonable not absolute assurance against 
material misstatement or loss 
42 
61 M 38) Summary of the process to review effectiveness of ICS 
by the board 
33 
62 M 38) The board’s process to deal with material internal 
control aspects of significant problems disclosed in 
annual report [point was awarded whether or not a 
problem was reported; as long as the process was 
described] 
8 
63 M 41) Material joint ventures and associates which have not 
been dealt with as part of the group and the Turnbull 
Guidance have not been applied are disclosed [point 
awarded if disclosed that Turnbull Guidance was applied 
to all material joint ventures and associates] 
7 
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Required statement narrative 
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64 V 42) The need for internal audit is reviewed from time to 
time [point awarded if no internal audit function is 
maintained, no review has taken place and this is 
disclosed – s. Sec. 47; this ensures that the overall max. 
points available are the same whether or not the unit has 
an internal audit] 
14 
65 V 43) Board is able to obtain objective assurances and advise 
on ICS 
15 
66 V 44) Management needs to employ other methods of 
monitoring with sufficient objective assurance if internal 
audit function is absent. [Point is available to units with 
internal audit if stated that they considered additional 
methods of assurance] 
2 
67 V 45) Trends are considered for the need of internal audit 
function or provision of adequate resources [Point is 
available to units without internal audit if stated that 
trends were considered for their alternative methods of 
assurance] 
2 
68 V 46) Board reviews annually scope of work of internal audit 
and its authority. [Point is available to units without 
internal audit if they reviewed the scope of their 
alternative methods of assurance] 
7 
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FR
S 
Required statement narrative 
Fr
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ue
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y 
69 M FRS13 Explanation of the role that financial instruments play in 
risk profile 
45 
70 M FRS13 Explanation of the board’s approach to managing each 
of these risks 
46 
71 M FRS13 Description of objective, policy and strategy for 
holding/issuing financial instruments 
45 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 7 – List of selected sample units in order of the draw 
D
ra
w
 
N
o.
 
Sample Unit 
D
ra
w
 
N
o.
 
Sample Unit 
1 Mice Group 37 ACAL 
2 Office2Office  [later eliminated] 38 
Danka Business Systems  
[later eliminated] 
3 Latchways 39 Premier Farnell 
4 Homeserve 40 4Imprint Group 
5 Ricardo 41 Infast Group [later eliminated] 
6 Macfarlane Group 42 Mitie Group 
7 Johnson Service Group 43 Mouchel Parkman 
8 Lavendon Group 44 Toad Group 
9 Teesland 45 PHS Group 
10 Serco Group 46 Ashtead Group 
11 Aukett Group 47 Speedy Hire 
12 Hays 48 Bunzl 
13 RAC 49 White Young Green 
14 Babcock International Group 50 Trifast 
15 Universal Salvage 
16 Brammer 
17 Tribal Group 
18 Rentokil Initial 
19 Hyder Consulting 
20 AEA Technology 
21 Corporate Services Group  [later eliminated] 
22 Waterman Group 
23 De La Rue 
24 VP 
25 Interserve 
26 API Group 
27 Intertek Group 
28 Watermark Group 
29 Diploma 
30 WSP Group 
31 Rexam 
32 Regus Group 
33 Laing (John) 
34 Brandon Hire 
35 Menzies (John) 
36 Robotic Technology Systems 
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APPENDIX C 
Graph 1 – Cook’s Distance Model 1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cook’s Distance measures the change in all of the regression coefficients when a case is 
eliminated from the analysis (Norusis 2004, p. 559). Graph 1 shows that the elimination 
of MacFarlane Group would change all of the coefficients most. However, Infast Group 
has a standardised residual of 3.426 in Model 1, and 3.348 in Model 2. Combined with 
the relatively high impact on the other coefficients it was decided to eliminate the unit 
from the sample. After elimination another regression was calculated and analysed for 
outliers. Graph 2 shows again MacFarlane Group as the unit that would change all other 
coefficients most if eliminated from the calculation. Corporate Services Group shows as 
the second highest Cook’s Distance value. Corporate Services Group, however, has a 
standardized residual value of –2.253 in Model 1 and –2.418 and was therefore 
eliminated. 
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Graph 2 – Cook’s Distance Model 1 
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APPENDIX D 
Table 8 – Pearson Correlation 
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te
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ud
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N
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at
io
 
R
O
C
E
 
Index 1.000                   
Audit Committee size 0.177 1.000                 
Average subst shareh 0.267 -0.110 1.000               
Capital Employed 0.356 -0.008 -0.056 1.000             
Freefloat 0.027 0.257 -0.630 0.145 1.000           
Gearing 0.346 0.098 0.187 0.059 -0.002 1.000         
iNED-Ratio 0.316 -0.006 0.064 0.128 -0.039 0.126 1.000       
Internal Audit 0.301 0.315 0.038 -0.008 0.020 0.360 -0.071 1.000     
NED-ratio 0.197 0.480 0.064 -0.058-0.110 0.122 0.166 -0.009 1.000   
P
ea
rs
on
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
ROCE -0.106 0.051 -0.077 -0.001-0.022-0.165 0.005 -0.134 0.091 1.000
Index .                   
Audit Committee size 0.119 .                 
Average subst shareh 0.036 0.234 .               
Capital Employed 0.008 0.478 0.356 .             
Freefloat 0.429 0.042 0.000 0.168 .           
Gearing 0.009 0.259 0.107 0.349 0.495 .         
iNED-Ratio 0.016 0.484 0.336 0.199 0.398 0.202 .       
Internal Audit 0.021 0.016 0.400 0.478 0.446 0.007 0.319 .     
NED-ratio 0.094 0.000 0.336 0.351 0.234 0.209 0.136 0.477 .   
1 
S
ig
. (
1-
ta
ile
d)
 
ROCE 0.242 0.367 0.306 0.498 0.442 0.137 0.487 0.187 0.274 . 
Index 1.000                   
Audit Committee size 0.177 1.000                 
Average subst shareh 0.267 -0.110 1.000               
Freefloat 0.027 0.257 -0.630 1.000             
Gearing 0.346 0.098 0.187 -0.002 1.000           
iNED-Ratio 0.316 -0.006 0.064 -0.039 0.126 1.000         
Internal Audit 0.301 0.315 0.038 0.020 0.360 -0.071 1.000       
NED-ratio 0.197 0.480 0.064 -0.110 0.122 0.166 -0.009 1.000     
ROCE -0.106 0.051 -0.077 -0.022-0.165 0.005 -0.134 0.091 1.000   
P
ea
rs
on
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Turnover 0.356 0.008 0.074 0.062 0.026 0.094 0.020 -0.120-0.015 1.000
Index .                   
Audit Committee size 0.119 .                 
Average subst shareh 0.036 0.234 .               
Freefloat 0.429 0.042 0.000 .             
Gearing 0.009 0.259 0.107 0.495 .           
iNED-Ratio 0.016 0.484 0.336 0.398 0.202 .         
Internal Audit 0.021 0.016 0.400 0.446 0.007 0.319 .       
NED-ratio 0.094 0.000 0.336 0.234 0.209 0.136 0.477 .     
ROCE 0.242 0.367 0.306 0.442 0.137 0.487 0.187 0.274 .   
2 
S
ig
. (
1-
ta
ile
d)
 
Turnover 0.008 0.478 0.313 0.342 0.432 0.267 0.449 0.213 0.460 . 
 
